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I~ rl~HE

SUPREME COURT
()F --rHE

STA,_fE OF UTAH
HAROLD BURLEIGH,
Plaintiff and :1 ppellant,
-- \'S.-

Case No. 10007

\\'ARDEN JOHN W. TURNER,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Harold Burleigh, appeals from a decision of the Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge, Fourth Judicial
District, State of Utah, denying the appellant's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITIO:\f OF THE CASE BELOW
On September 9, 1963, the appellant, Harold Burleigh,
filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah (Case No. 9988). By order of the Chief Justice, on September 9, 1963, the appellant's petition was
referred for hearing before the Honorable R. L. Tuckett,
Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County. The
respondent filed an answer to the petition on the 16th day
of September, 1963. On September 17 and September 20,
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1963, hearing was had before the trial court on the substance of the appellant's petition for habeas corpus. On
September 20, 1963, the trial court entered a minute order
which was filed on October 8, 1963, denying the appellant's
petition for habeas corpus.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent contends the case is not at the present time
properly before the court, and/or that the decision of Judge
Tuckett should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's petition in this case was filed as an original writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court. ( R. 4) .
The Chief Justice thereafter referred the matter for hearing
before the Fourth Judicial District Court. ( R. 3 ) . The
appellant alleged in his petition that on the 6th day of November, 1959, he was committed to the Utah State Prison
on the charge of issuing a fictitious check, in violation of
76-26-7, U.C.A. 1953. (R. 5). The appellant alleged that
the commitment was pursuant to a plea of guilty entered
before the court on the 6th day of November, 1959, but that
the plea of guilty was the result of an erroneous identification of the appellant as the individual who had issued a
fictitious check which was the subject of the information.
Further, the appellant alleged that his health was in jeopardy as the result of narcotics withdrawal, hepatitis, etc.,
and that he entered the plea in order to obtain hospitalization. (R. 5, 6).
Appellant's petition alleged that he had theretofore unsuccessfully sought relief by habeas corpus from the same
commitment by a petition and hearing before the HonorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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abk Joseph G. Jeppson on December 14,1961 and January
~). l~l6~. (R. 6). A copy of the proceedings before the Honorabk A. H. Ellett on November 6, 1959, at which time the
appellant plead guilty, were attached to and made a part of
the record. ( R. 20 through 23) . These proceedings disclosed that the appellant was represented by counsel, Sumncr J. Hatch, Esq.; that he was interrogated by the court
and l\lr. Hatch relating to the entry of his plea of guilty.

(R. 21).
"~lR.

HATCH: ~[r. Burleigh, you understand youhavearightfor
a period of time to enter a plea in this court?
~ll~. BURLEIGH: That's right.
~lR. I lATCH: And you have heard the information?
~ lR.

BURLEIGH: Right.
HATCH: .\nd you have discussed the matter with me as to
the basis of the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by
law and what it is?
~lR. BURLEIGH: I have.
~lR. HATCH: And you are also aware that after entering a plea
that with the record you have, there is no basis for referring for
parole and probation. Is that correct?
~lR. BURLEIGH: That's correct .
.MR. HATCH: And you are ready to enter a plea at this time?
~1R. BURLEIGH: That's correct.
THE COURT: What plea will you enter?
~ LR. BURLEIGH: Guilty.
~ lR.

THE COURT: Is that your advice to him, Mr. Hatch?
MR. HATCH: That is my advice to him, Your Honor. We further for the record waive the time for sentencing on his statement.
.-\t this time- I mean for entering plea. We would also I believe
wai\·e time for sentencing. Is that correct, Mr. Burleigh?
~IR. BURLEIGH: That's correct."

The record of the proceedings before the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson was certified as part of the record of
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this case on appeal. It appeared that on the 30th day of
January, 1962, Judge Jeppson, pursuant to the previous
hearing upon the appellant's petition, entered his findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and that on the same day
entered his judgment denying the appellant's exceptions
thereto and the appellant's petition for habeas corpus. The
appellant did not perfect an appeal from that decision, but
on September 9, 1963, approximately eight months later,
filed an original writ before the Supreme Court.
At the time of the hearing before Judge Tuckett, the
trial court heard two witnesses who gave evidence as to the
appellant's petition. The first was a Mr. Kresh Juretich
(R. 182), who testified that he saw the appellant in the
County Jail prior to his commitment, and that he was sick
and in need of a doctor, and that, in his opinion, he was not
guilty. (R. 183-184). Gladys Nieser was called and testified that in 1959 she was a checker at Albertson's Market,
Second South and Fourth East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R.
185) ; that she accepted a fictitious check and at that time
identified Mr. Burleigh, the appellant, as the individual
who passed the check. (R. 186). However, she is presently
of the opinion that it was another individual and not Mr.
Burleigh. ( R. 186) .
The record of the proceeding before Judge Jeppson was
apparently considered by the trial court in the hearing before Judge Tuckett. (R. 173). The evidence in this proceeding discloses that upon the appellant's commitment to
the State Prison, Dr. William C. Knott, the attending physician at the State Prison, diagnosed the appellant as suffering from withdrawal symptoms attendant to narcotics addiction, hepatitis, and having flesh burns on his chest. (R.
52). He was very sick at that time. ( R. 53). However, he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was lucid and not mentally deranged. ( R. 55, 56). The appellant, who testified at his previous hearing, indicated that
he knew what he was doing at the time he plead guilty ( R.
111), and that he had previously discussed the action he
took with counsel. (R. 103). Further, he was aware that
pleading guilty to a fictitious check charge carried a lesser
penalty than a second conviction for narcotics violation,
and there were two charges pending against him for narcotics violation. ( R. 86, 102) .
The evidence offered at that hearing relative to the identity of the appellant having committed the crime showed
that Mrs. Nieser had originally identified him as being the
individual who had passed the fictitious check at her place
of employment. ( R. 59-60) . Thereafter she identified Mr.
Burleigh as the culprit in a police lineup. She indicated
that at that time, the time of the hearing before Judge
Jeppson, she felt that another individual by the name of
Crane was the person who had passed the check, but she
admitted that there was no question in her mind at the time
of her identification of Mr. Burleigh, that she thought he
was the individual who had committed the crime. ( R. 76) .
Judge Jeppson, in his findings of fact, found that the
petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary, and that at the
time he entered the plea, he was in complete control of his
mental faculties and entered the plea in an effort to obtain
the benefit of not being charged on narcotics offenses. ( R.
28) . The court felt that there was no clear factual basis
warranting relief. ( R. 29).
Based upon all the evidence before Judge Tuckett, he
orally stated on the 20th day of September, 1963, that the
appellant's petition was denied. (R. 188). No order to that
effect "·as ever entered. A minute entry was entered by the
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clerk denying the petition on October 8, 1963. (R. 42, rear
of page). On the 8th day of October, 1963, the appellant
filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of Judge Tuckett.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CASE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT ON APPEAL.

The record discloses that no formal order has ever been
entered by the trial court denying the appellant's petition
for habeas corpus. 78-2-2, U.C.A. 1953, gives the Supreme
Court the right to issue an original writ of habeas corpus.
The writ in this instance, although directed to the Supreme
Court, was made returnable before the District Court. As
a consequence, the action of the District Court was not the
act of the Supreme Court, nor did it purport to act as a
master in taking evidence by referring the matter to the
Supreme Court. As a consequence, it is necessary that a
final order be entered before the Supreme Court may have
appellate jurisdiction. 78-2-2, U.C.A. 1953.
Habeas corpus is a civil remedy and generally governed
by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Winnovich v. Emery, 33
Utah 345, 93 Pac. 988; State v. Kelsey, 64 Utah 377, 231
Pac. 122. In such cases, it is clear that a minute entry is not
a final judgment of the trial court from which an appeal
may lie. Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d
1277, this court ruled that a minute entry entered by the
trial court was not such an order as would be appealable,
and thus allow the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction. The
court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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··.\nd it is well settled in this jurisdiction that an appeal from what
constitutes a finding merely as compared to a judgment which
actually adjudicates the rights of the parties is not appealable.
Thus, an appeal from a verdict where judgment has not been
entered. Kourbetis v. National Copper Bank, 71 Utah 232, 264
P. 72·1. Nor from an order for judgment. Ellinwood v. Bennion,
73 Ctah 23-29 563, 276 P. 159. Nor from a minute order disInissing appeal.***"

Since no final order has been entered in this matter, it is
submitted that this court is without jurisdiction to review
the trial court's action until such order is entered.
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT MAY NOT CLAIM RELIEF ON HABEAS
CORPUS BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF AN APPEAL TO BE
TAKEN FROM A PREVIOUS ADVERSE DETERMINATION
0:'-I AN APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

The appellant, for the first time on appeal, contends that
he should not be precluded or barred by his previous application, and the denial thereof, for a writ of habeas corpus
before the Honorable Joseph Jeppson because of failure to
appeal. No issue was made at the hearing before the Honorable R. L. Tuckett that he was in anyway prevented from
taking an appeal, nor did he protest in anyway the failure
of an appeal to be taken in his behalf. Thus, the first time
the question has been raised as to whether or not the appellant may have some remedy still available to him on
account of the failure of a previous appeal appears in his
brief now on file before this court. The appellant contends
that it was a failure of counsel to perfect his appeal rather
than a failure of any action on his part.
It should be noted, first, that there is no requirement that
counsel be furnished to a petitioner seeking relief by habeas
corpus. The decision of Douglas v. California, 83 S.Ct. 814
( 1963) involved only the question of whether or not due
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process required that counsel be furnished during the "first
appeal" from a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court
in that case specifically denied that it was deciding the issue
of whether counsel must be provided an indigent seeking a
discretionary hearing after his appeal.
In a monograph entitled, "Increased Rights for Defendants in State Criminal Prosecutions," National Association
of Attorneys General, page 33, it is noted that at the present time there is no requirement that counsel be provided
in collateral proceedings, and that due process has not as
yet been extended to encompass such a requirement, even
within the federal system. 1 Even so, the motion filed in this
case, No. 10007, clearly demonstrates that every effort was
made by the court to provide counsel for the accused, and
that various counsel who examined the nature of the appellant's petition felt that there was no merit to the position.
Although not a matter of record, but a matter of which
this court may take judicial notice, is the fact that Calvin
E. Clark, who acted as counsel for the appellant, indicated
in the presence of the Chief Justice and a member of the
Attorney General's office that he could find no basis to claim
relief on appeal. Even so, it is well settled that habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy to claim relief because of
the failure of counsel to perfect an appeal. 19 A.L.R.2d
789. In the previously referred to annotation, at page 794,
it is noted:
"Generally, one convicted of crime in a court having jurisdiction,
without violation of any constitutional right, cannot successfully
contend in habeas corpus proceedings that he was deprived of the
right to appeal by reason merely of some act or omission of his
counsel resulting in failure to get it heard in the appellate court."
1

Copies of this monograph were supplied to this court by the National Association of Attorneys General.
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Srr also AI oore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, lOth Circuit

( 1939) , ".here the court stated :

"* * * [It] is not a necessary element of due process of law and is not
incumbent upon the trial court to see to it that defendant's attorney perfects an appeal."

Sec also Ex Parte Whitson, 70 Okla. Crim. 79, 104 P.2d

980 ( 1940).
Consequently, appellant is in no position to claim relief
by virtue of an alleged failure of hired or appointed counsel
to perfect an appeal. The nature of the case itself is such
that a reasonable conclusion arises that counsel could find
no meritorious basis for an appeal.
POINT III.
IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF BASED UPON
THE RECORD NOW BEFORE THE COURT.
APPELL:\~\T

The record in the instant case discloses that the appellant knowingly plead guilty to the offense for which he is
now being detained. Appellant's plea of guilty was accepted
by the court only after full inquiry by both the court and
counsel as to whether or not the appellant was fully aware
of the act he was undertaking. The appellant, himself, by
his testimony before Judge Jeppson, admitted that he knew
what he was doing at the time he entered his plea of guilty.
(R. 111). It is ,,·ell settled that a plea of guilty has the
effect of admitting each and every element of the crime,
including the identity of the accused as being the individual
charged in the information, and being the individual who
committed the crime. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th
Ed., Sec. 91, notes:
"The plea of guilty, unless withdrawn, has the same effect in respect
to the subsequent proceedings thereon against the accused as averdict of guilty."
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Consequently, when the appellant entered his plea, knowing full well the consequences of the plea and the nature
of the act he was doing, he cannot now be heard to complain. There is no contention that his will was overborne
by the prosecution or the court, and Judge Jeppson expressly found that the appellant was in complete control
of his mental faculties at the time he entered his plea, and
that he did so, in part, to obtain the benefits of reduced action against him on other pending narcotics charges. Although there is nothing express in the record which would
indicate that a direct promise was made that the narcotics
charges would be dropped, there is substantial evidence to
indicate that the appellant was aware that his commitment
on the fictitious check charge may have deterred the prosecution on the narcotics charge. Further, there is no evidence
that the narcotics charges have in fact been pressed. Therefore, it must be concluded that there is no merit to the appellant's contention that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily entered, and that he now may seek some relief to void
that plea.
Although the appellant contends that he was not the individual who committed the crime, he does not deny that
he was the individual in fact who was charged with the
crime. It is well settled that the question of guilt or innocence is not a proper matter for inquiry on habeas corpus.
Most recently, the Colorado Supreme Court, in the case
of Specht v. Tinsley, 385 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1963), stated:
"Habeas corpus is not intended to take the place of review by writ of
error, and the fact that one may be improperly or unlawfully confined 'for any criminal or supposed criminal matter' does not, ipso
facto, entitle him to be 'discharged' or 'admitted to bail' or in 'any
other manner relieved' through the use of habeas corpus. * * *"
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In 39 C.J.S., Habeas Cor pus, Sec. 13, it is stated:
·Till' right of a person to the writ of habeas corpus depends on the
legality or illegality of his detention, and this in turn depends .on
whether the fundamental requirements of law have been complied

with, and not at all on the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, or
the justice or injustice of his detention on the merits. * * *"

Sec also fj'x Parte Yahne, 193 Cal. 386, 224 Pac. 542.

The appellant cites several cases in his brief for the
proposition that identity is a factor subject to inquiry by
habeas corpus. It must be noted that the identity discussed
in the cases cited by the appellant does not relate to the
factual question of whether the accused was or was not the
person who committed the crime; rather, the issue decided
by those cases is ( 1 ) whether the individual being held is
in fact the person charged; ( 2) whether or not there has
been an impersonation of the person charged, Foster v.
Perry, 71 Fla. 155, 70 So. 1007; and ( 3), whether or not
the individual sought to be extradited is in fact the person
charged with the crime, or whether he was within the jurisdiction to \\·hich he is sought to be returned. Scott and Roe,
HabeasCorpus,pp.15, 392,407,412.
Consequently, since the appellant's claim of lack of identity goes only to a factual determination as to his guilt or
innocence, it is not a matter properly the subject of inquiry
by habeas corpus.
In spite of this, the particular issue must be resolved
against the appellant's since, first, he admitted his identity
with his plea of guilty. Secondly, the appellant was the individual identified by at least one witness at the time of the
occurrence although some time later the witness retracted
her identification of the appellant. Further, appellant was
identified during a police lineup as the culprit. Both trial
judges made determinations against him relative to whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or not the factual identity was sufficient to sustain the conviction. At best, the appellant's contentions go to issues of
fact which, when analyzed against his plea of guilty, afford
him no relief by habeas corpus. Further, the previous determination of one court (Judge Jeppson), after full hearing, that there was no merit to the appellant's petition, and
the subsequent similar determination before another court
(Judge Tuckett) warrants rejection of any relief on appeal.
39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, Sec. 105, pp. 698 and 700.
POINT IV.
THE APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM RELIEF BY
HABEAS CORPUS.

It is submitted that the appellant in the instant case is
clearly estopped to claim relief by habeas corpus from his
present commitment. The evidence of record discloses that
the appellant, with eyes wide open, entered his plea of
guilty. Judge Jeppson made a finding of fact to the effect
that the appellant received the benefit of arrested prosecution on other charges by entering his plea to the instant
offense, and that the other charges were of a substantially
more serious nature. To allow the appellant to wait some
two years from the time of his commitment before seeking
any judicial relief, where the appellant had full knowledge
of the facts at the time he entered his plea, would allow
the appellant to play games with the law. The statute of
limitations may well have run against the narcotics offenses
or the prosecution's evidence may no longer be available.
Having elected the course to follow, the appellant may not
now, at this late date, request consideration from this court.
Any error that may exist in the appellant's case was selfinduced and he is, therefore, estopped to request relief.
58 A.L.R. 1286; 62 A.L.R.2d 432; People v. Vernon, 9 Cal.
App. 2d 138,49 P.2d 326.
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CONCLUSION

An analysis of the record in this case clearly demonstrates
that there is no legal nor factual basis for appellant to obtain the rdid of this court The court does not have jurisdiction onT the matter, habeas corpus is an inappropriate
remedy, the record evidences no factual basis for relief, and
the equities that may be existent in this case are unfavorable
to the appellant by virtue of his action in precipitating the
condition he now finds himself in.
Respectfully submitted
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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